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1980s account for between one-third and one-half of the growth in earnings inequality
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in real terms between 1974 and 1988.  Rising returns to skills in the face of large
increase in the supply of skilled labor suggest a substantial shift in labor demand in
favor of skilled workers.  Changes in British labor market institutions, particularly the
decline in trade union density may also help to explain part of the rise in inequality
during the 1980s.
This paper was produced as part of the Centre's 
Programme on Human Resources.
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF MALE EARNINGS IN BRITAIN, 1974-88
John Schmitt
Page
I. Introduction   1
II. The data   3
III. Changes in the British wage structure   6
IV. Supply, demand and labor market
institutions  14
V. Some conclusions  27
Endnotes  29
Tables  32
Figures  44
References  50
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF MALE EARNINGS IN BRITAIN, 1974-88
John Schmitt1
I. Introduction
While many of the changes in the U.S. wage structure during the 1970s and
1980s have been well-documented , little comparable work exists for Britain.   This2 3
paper uses data on male, full-time employees from the annual General Household
Survey (GHS) to examine developments in the British wage structure during the
period 1974-88.
The GHS data indicate that the British wage structure was far from stable
during 1970s and 1980s.  Earnings inequality fell slightly during the 1970s only to rise
rapidly in the 1980s.  Returns to labor market skills such as education and experience
declined dramatically in the 1970s and then recovered in the 1980s, though not
always enough to compensate the earlier losses.  Meanwhile, earnings for low-skilled
workers increased in real terms over the entire period 1974-88.
The increases in earnings inequality and returns to skills during the 1980s
parallel developments in the United States.  However, the decline in British earnings
inequality and skill differentials through the end of the 1970s, and particularly the
real earnings successes of low-skilled British workers over both decades, stand in
strong contrast to the U.S. experience.
This paper documents some of the key developments of the British wage
structure sketched above.  It also attempts to explain these changes in the context of
a simple relative supply and demand framework which takes into account the role
of labor market institutions.  It seeks to use the similarities and differences between
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the U.S. and Britain to shed light on the forces producing the upheavals in the wage
structures of both countries.
The main conclusion is that a simple supply and demand analysis can
plausibly explain most of the developments in the British wage structure during the
1970s and 1980s.  A large rise in the relative supply of skilled labor during the 1970s
drove skill differentials down and indirectly contributed to wage compression.  In the
1980s, a large rise in the relative demand for skilled labor forced skill differentials
and earnings inequality up despite continued strong growth in the supply of skilled
labor.  The GHS evidence, however, lends little support to the idea that the cause of
the increasing relative demand for skills was a decline in the manufacturing sector
in favor of services.  Instead, it seems that technological or work-organization related
changes within industrial sectors were more likely to be driving the increase in
demand for skilled workers.
Labor market institutions, which moderate the workings of the market to a
much greater degree in Britain than in the U.S., may play an important role in
explaining the differences between the two countries.  In the U.S., low-skilled workers
saw absolute declines in real earnings with only moderate rises in relative
unemployment;  in Britain, the low-skilled experienced increases in real earnings and
much higher unemployment rates.  In the context of a supply and demand model,
both countries may have faced the same shift in relative demand.  The "free-market"
in the U.S. led workers to a "low-wage, high-employment" outcome, while British
labor market institutions, particularly trade unions, may have allowed workers to
"choose" a "high-pay, low-employment" point on the same relative demand curve.
The relative strength of British trade unions, Wages Councils, and incomes policies
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may also have delayed the onset of the rise in wage inequality in Britain, relative to
the U.S.  
II. The Data
The principle source of data is the annual General Household Survey (GHS)
for the years 1974-88.  The GHS is a survey of between 10,000 and 12,000 households
in England, Scotland and Wales conducted continuously throughout the year.  It
provides detailed, nationally-representative information on individuals.  Throughout
this paper, I analyze a sub-sample of the GHS comprised of males aged 16 (the legal
minimum age for leaving school) to 64 (the retirement age for males).4
The wage variable is the log of weekly earnings for full-time employees
deflated using the appropriate monthly Retail Price Index (RPI) with January, 1974
as the base.  The questions used to calculate weekly earnings underwent some change
between the 1974-78 and the 1979-88 periods.  For the years 1974-78, weekly earnings
were derived from all earnings including wages, salaries, tips, bonuses and
commissions in all jobs held in the previous twelve months.  To calculate weekly
earnings, I divided these total earnings by total weeks worked in the previous twelve
months.  In the 1979-88 surveys, weekly earnings were estimated as the usual gross
earnings including tips and bonuses per pay period from the worker's main job,
divided by the usual number of weeks covered in each pay period.  These changes
may affect comparisons of earnings between the two periods, but no discontinuity is
evident and the GHS weekly earnings data appear to be consistent with data from
the New Earnings Survey (NES).  Unfortunately, no hourly wage series is available
due to substantial changes in work hours information collected after 1983.
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The education variables are based on the highest educational qualification
earned by the respondent.  The use of qualification-based variables offers two
advantages over education measures based on years of schooling.  First, the
qualification variables outperform years variables in standard human capital
equations (see Schmitt, 1991a).  Second, the value of different types of qualifications,
particularly vocational versus academic qualifications, may shed more light on the
workings of the supply and demand for skills than an undifferentiated years variable.
A complete list and brief description of the educational variables appears in
Table 1.  The large number of categories reflects the relatively complicated structure
of British educational qualifications.  All British children must attend full-time
education until the age of 16, the age when a large portion of them leave school.5
Those who leave school without earning a qualification join the "No Qualifications"
(NO QUAL) group.  This is by far the largest group in the sample, compromising
approximately 54 percent of the male labor force in 1974 and 32 percent in 1988.
Those who earn qualifications, broadly speaking, follow either a vocational
or an academic track.  Workers generally earn vocational qualifications while they
work, through apprenticeship schemes, part-time study, or relatively short periods
of full-time study "sandwiched" between spells of employment, often with the same
employer.  The vocational qualifications increase in skill from miscellaneous,
relatively low-skilled apprenticeships (VOC-OTHER) through incremented, nationally-
recognized apprenticeships (VOC-LOW, VOC-MIDDLE, and VOC-HIGH).  The
highest level vocational qualifications can involve some instruction at what in the U.S.
would be college level.  Some of the qualifications in Table 1 usually facilitate entry
into female-dominated occupations such as teaching, nursing, and clerical jobs
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(CLERICAL, OLEV&CLER, NURSING, TEACHING).  Few men earn these
qualifications.
School children following the "academic track" prepare for and sit a series of
national tests by academic subject.  Passing grades on these exams, generally taken
around age 16, lead to qualifications that would place individuals in the OTHER, O-
LEVEL 1-4, O-LEV&CLER, and O-LEVEL 5+ categories.  The "Ordinary Level"
examination categories distinguish between students who pass between one and four
examinations, and those who attempt and pass five or more.  The distinction is
important for some employers and for further study.  After "O-levels", some students
(usually around age 18) take further national examinations at "Advanced level".  For
some students, "A-levels" are a terminal qualification; for others they are only a
prerequisite for university admission.  The UNIVERSITY category here includes all
students who successfully complete the standard three year university course as well
as those who study further.  The group with university qualifications represents
about 5 percent of the total male labor force in 1974, rising to approximately 11
percent by 1988.
The other principal human capital variable (EXP) measures potential labor
market experience, defined in the standard way as age minus age left full-time
education.   The GHS contains no measure of actual labor market experience, but6
limiting the sample to males age 16 to 64 should reduce some of the difficulties
associated with using potential rather than actual experience.
A significant drawback of the GHS data is the poor information on workers'
industry characteristics.  From 1974 to 1980, the GHS reports 24 consistent industry
classifications.  From 1981 to 1988, the industry classification system is reduced to 10
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one-digit SIC categories, which can't be matched consistently with the earlier
classification.  As a result, I have been forced to reduce the industrial categories to
only 7 groupings in order to find a definition which is consistent over the 15 year
sample.  The seven categories, however, do allow for a distinction between
manufacturing (3 categories) and services, the two sectors which have featured
prominently in much of the discussion of the changing wage structure in Britain and
the U.S.
III. Changes in the British Wage Structure
A. Earnings inequality
Earnings inequality in Britain fell slightly during the 1970s only to rise
rapidly during the 1980s.  Meanwhile in the U.S., inequality grew continuously over
both decades (see, for example, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1989, Table 1 and Figure 3).
The data in panel (a) of Table 2 summarize the British earnings distribution
at three periods of the GHS sample, 1974-76, 1978-80, and 1986-88.  Following much
of the work in the U.S., the basic measure of inequality in Table 2 is the difference
between the log earnings of workers in different percentiles of the earnings
distribution.  Table 2 also reports the standard deviation of log earnings, another
measure of earnings dispersion.
Both measures of inequality paint the same picture.  The 90-10 differential
(the difference between the log earnings of workers in the 90th and the 10th
percentiles of the distribution) and the standard deviation of log earnings show a
slight decline (0.01 log points) between 1974-76 and 1978-80.  Both measures,
however, increased by approximately 20 percent between 1978-80 and 1986-88 (the
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90-10 differential by 0.22 log points, and the standard deviation of log earnings by
0.11 log points).  The rise in dispersion in the 1980s does not appear to be simply a
phenomenon of the tails of the distribution since the data also indicate a steep rise
in the 75-25 differential during the 1980s.
Figure 1 makes the same point more dramatically.  The figure shows the log
point change, relative to 1974, in real earnings for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
of the earnings distribution.  From 1974 to 1980, earnings of the 10th percentile grew
faster than those in the 50th and 90th percentiles; the earnings of the 90th percentile
grew at the slowest rate.  After 1980, the growth positions reversed with 10th
percentile earnings remaining flat over most of the rest of the sample and the 90th
percentile making large gains.
B. Educational and experience differentials
A portion of the changes in overall inequality in Britain during the 1970s and
1980s was due to the decline and subsequent recovery of financial returns to labor
market skills.  Education and experience differentials fell steeply between the mid-
and late-1970s.  By 1986-88, however, education differentials had made a strong
recovery, and experience differentials had more than made up for ground lost in the
previous decade.  In the U.S., education differentials reached historic lows in the mid-
1970s and grew rapidly through the late 1980s (see Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman,
1991, Table 2 and Figure 2).  Experience differentials in the U.S. increased steadily
after 1970, especially during the 1980s (see Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1989, Table 3).
To measure the change in returns to labor market skills in Britain, I have
estimated identical human capital weekly earnings equations for fifteen consecutive
years of General Household Survey data.  Each equation explains the log of real
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weekly earnings as a function of 13 education qualification dummy variables, their
full interactions with years of potential experience and its square, and 9 regional
dummies.  Due to the omission of ability, family background and other variables, the
human capital equations may yield biased estimates of the level of returns to skills
in the individual regressions.  However, assuming that the effects of these biases are
constant over time, the difference in estimated returns from one year to the next
should provide a consistent estimate of the change in the returns.
  The education differentials in panel (a) of Table 3A are calculated as the
sum of the coefficient for the qualification-specific dummy variable, plus the value
of the qualification-specific experience differential evaluated at 20 years of experience,
minus the experience differential for a worker with no qualifications also evaluated
at 20 years.  This formulation of the differential allows a simple yet flexible
representation of the returns to a qualification: qualifications can provide a once-and-
for all boost (through the qualification dummy), and a different earnings profile
(through the qualification-specific experience terms).  The returns to high- and mid-
level  qualifications  (UNIVERSITY,  VOC-HIGH,  A-LEVEL,  VOC-MIDDLE,  and
O-LEVEL 5+) in Table 3A all decline between the first and second periods.  In the
1980s, however, the differentials for these qualifications increase strongly, although
generally not enough to offset the declines of the 1970s.  The returns to the low-level
qualifications (VOC-LOW, O-LEVEL 1-4, and VOC-OTHER) manage modest gains in
the 1980s which exceed losses during the 1970s.  
Figure 2 plots the estimated returns at 20 years experience for condensed
educational qualifications (UNIV, MIDDLE and LOW) over all 15 years in the
sample.   The returns to university and mid-level qualifications fall through 1979-80,7
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rise again until 1984, and then remain approximately constant through the end of the
sample.
Panel (b) of Table 3A shows the estimated differentials for years of potential
experience.  The figures reported are the fixed weighted averages of the experience
differentials for all 14 education categories evaluated at the number of years indicated
in the label.  The weights used were the average employment shares of the education
categories for the period 1974-88.  The experience differentials show declines in the
1970s followed by strong gains in the 1980s.  By the late 1980s, experience premia
were well above the levels prevailing in the mid-1970s.
Similar estimates of changes in education and experience differentials for
workers age 16 to 30 appear in Table 3B.  Since younger workers have shorter tenure
with the firms where they work, their earnings are likely to be more responsive to
market forces changing the earnings structure.  In the U.S., for example, increases in
experience and education differentials were higher among younger workers than the
population as a whole.  The regression results summarized in Table 3B show that the
rise in skill differentials was also more marked among young British workers.
C. Residual Inequality
 Education and experience differentials can explain only a portion of the
change in overall inequality in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s.  As earnings
differentials rose between education and experience groups in the 1980s, earnings
dispersion was also increasing within these same groups.  The same is true for the
U.S. where changes in education and experience differentials can account for only
about one-half of the increase in overall inequality since the mid-1970s (see, for
example, Juhn, Murphy, Pierce, 1989, Table 4).  
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The regression residuals from the earnings equations in the previous section
clearly establish that changes in education and experience differentials fail to explain
most of the rise in overall inequality.  Panel (b) of Table 2 summarizes the
distribution of these residuals for the three key time periods. The residuals can be
interpreted as individual earnings purged of any systematic differences between
"groups" defined by the explanatory variables in the regression (education and
experience).  If the increase in overall inequality were due solely to rising inequality
between education-experience groups, we would expect the residual distribution to
show no tendency toward greater inequality: the overall inequality would stem from
changing endowments, or market valuations of human capital which the earnings
regression would "remove" from the data.  In fact, residual inequality rises
considerably.  The 90-10 differential for residual earnings grew 0.138 log points
between 1978-80 and 1986-88, versus a 0.223 log points rise for raw earnings.  By this
crude measure, changes in returns to education and experience can account for only
40 percent of the rise in British earnings inequality during the 1980s.  Approximately
60 percent of the increase occurred within education and experience groups.
D. Real earnings of low-skilled workers
While inequality increased substantially in Britain during the 1980s, the real
earnings of employed, full-time, low-skilled workers were also growing.  In the U.S.,
on the other hand, inequality increased in large measure because the real earnings of
low-skilled workers fell.  High school drop-outs or workers in the 10th percentile of
the U.S. earnings distribution, for example, suffered steady and significant reductions
in real annual and weekly earnings after the late 1960s (see, for example, Blackburn,
Bloom and Freeman, 1991, Table 1 and Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1989, Figure 3).
-11-
The median real weekly earnings of British workers with no qualifications
increased by approximately 0.30 log points between 1974 and 1988.  Since this results
stands in such contrast with the experience of the U.S., I have made several attempts
to check the robustness of the result to different ways of defining low-skilled
workers, and to confirm the GHS results using other data sources.
While those without educational qualification may be a natural choice to
represent "low-skilled" workers, they may not be entirely representative of the low-
skilled.  One important reason is that workers with no qualifications tend to be older
than those with qualifications.  On average, workers without qualifications may have
been able to improve their earnings position by capturing some of the rise in returns
to experience during the 1980s.  One way to reduce the potential for this experience
effect is to choose workers in the 10th percentile of the distribution as a proxy for
low-skilled workers.  As Figure 1 shows, real earnings for workers in the 10th
percentile increased by approximately 0.20 log points over the sample period.
At between one-third and one-half of the total sample in each year, the no
qualifications group is also much larger than the natural low-skilled groupings in the
U.S. such as high school dropouts.  It could be that even as median real earnings for
the no qualification group were rising, the earnings of the less-skilled among those
without qualifications were dropping.  However, by 1988 real earnings for the 10th
percentile of the no qualification group were approximately 0.15 log points above
their level in 1974.
The GHS results are also consistent with other publicly available data on
British earnings.  Published data from the New Earnings Survey, an annual survey
of approximately one percent of the British labor force collected through their
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employers, indicates that the weekly and hourly wages of workers in the 10th
percentile of the male earnings distribution, both increased by between 10 and 13
percent between 1974 and 1988  (see, for example, Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower
(this volume), and Schmitt, 1992).  8
E. Employment rates
One of the most striking features of the British wage structure over the period
1974-88 was the large number of people who fell out of it entirely.  The
unemployment rate quadrupled between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s -- from
under 3 percent to over 12 percent.  The incidence of unemployment fell much more
heavily on the low-skilled than the population as a whole.  The unemployment rate
for workers with no qualifications exceeded 15 percent in the mid-1980s, with long-
term unemployment especially high among those with no qualifications.  In the U.S.,
low-skilled workers also bore the brunt of rising unemployment in the 1970s and
early 1980s, but the overall and skill-specific unemployment rates were much lower
than in Britain (see, for example, Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman, 1991, Table 3). 
To measure the relative unemployment experience of British workers, I have
estimated unemployment rates by educational qualification using separate binary
probit equations for each of the years of the GHS.  Panel (a) of Table 4 summarizes
the probit-predicted unemployment rates for the three sub-periods assuming all
workers were 40 years old.  The unemployment rates for nearly all qualifications
closely track changes in the overall unemployment rate: little change between 1974-76
and 1978-80, followed by large increases through 1986-88.  Figure 3 graphs the
complete unemployment series for the four condensed education categories
introduced earlier.
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In a world with involuntary unemployment, the return to education has two
components -- a higher wage while employed and a higher probability of finding and
keeping a job.  In this simple framework, we can adjust the earlier education
differentials to include the differential employment probability associated with a
given qualification.  Defining the employment probability as one minus the estimated
unemployment rate, the relative employment rate for qualification i is then (1 - u )/(1i
- u ).   While relative employment rates were low and constant during the 1970s,NOQUAL
they rose substantially in the 1980s.  Adjusting the changes in education differentials
for the changes in relative employment substantially increases the returns to
education during the 1980s.  Among university graduates, for example, the rise in the
education differential between 1978-80 and 1986-88 increases from 0.067 to 0.113 log
points after factoring in the change in employment probabilities over the period.9
Given the large drop in labor force participation rates among working age
males during the 1980s, the unemployment rates in panel (a) of Table 4 tell only part
of the story of the decline in employment rates.  Panel (b) of Table 4 lists the sample
employment-population ratios calculated from the raw GHS data.  They show an
even sharper drop in relative employment probabilities than implied by the
unemployment rates.  Except for A-LEVEL and O-LEVEL 5+, employment-population
rates in the 1974-76 clustered around 90 percent.   By 1986-88, employment-10
population rates fell off by a few percentage points for highly skilled workers and
plummeted by 14 percentage points for workers with no qualifications.
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IV. Supply, demand, and labor market institutions
Simple models of relative supply and demand for workers of different skill
levels have been quite successful in explaining changes in skill differentials in the
U.S.   A relative supply and demand model also seems a natural benchmark for an11
analysis of British skill differentials.  In this section, I examine the market for skilled
labor in Britain taking into account the evolving role of several British labor market
institutions. 
A. Relative supply of skills
In Britain, the rise in supply of workers with educational qualifications
during the 1970s and 1980s was dramatic.  A breakdown of the male labor force by
educational qualifications for the three sub-periods of the GHS sample appears in
Table 5.  In 1974-76, workers with no qualifications comprised over half of the male
labor force.  By 1986-88 they were less than one-third of the total.  Over the same
period, workers with university degrees more than doubled from about 5 to 11
percent of the total labor force.  Interestingly, the share of workers with the highest
levels of vocational qualifications (VOC-HIGH and VOC-MIDDLE) also doubled over
the three periods.  Only two of the educational groups failed to increase their share
of the labor force over the full sample: five or more O-levels (O-LEVEL 5+) and the
lowest vocational qualification (VOC-OTHER).  Given the fall in workers with no
qualifications, these declines probably reflect decisions by individuals not to end their
education after achieving these qualifications, but instead to use them to gain access
to further education.
In a competitive labor market with constant relative demand, an increase in
the relative supply of skilled labor would reduce the relative wages of skilled labor.
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The large increase in the relative supply of skilled labor is consistent with the
observed decline in returns to education in Britain during the 1970s, but makes more
difficult a coherent explanation of the recovery of education differentials in the 1980s.
The coincident rise in supplies of, and differentials for skilled works during the 1980s
strongly suggests that the relative demand for skilled workers must have grown
substantially over the decade. 
One of the major developments of the post-war period in both Britain and the
U.S. was the enormous increase in female participation in the paid work force.  New
female workers may have competed disproportionately with low-skilled male
workers, thus helping to widen skill differentials.  Panel (b) of Table 5 reports the
ratio of females to males by educational qualification for the three sub-periods.  In
1974-76, there was approximately one female graduate for every four male graduates.
By 1986-88, the ratio had doubled to nearly 1 female graduate for every 2 male
graduates.  In comparison, the ratio of females to males among workers with no
qualifications increased from 81 percent to 86 percent in the same period.  The rise
in female participation, therefore, led to a disproportionate rise in competition for
qualified workers.   The rise in female participation actually makes it more difficult12
to explain widening differentials in the 1980s. 
The large growth in the relative supply of skilled labor may lie behind the
decline in skill differentials and inequality in the 1970s.  In the absence of new
sources of competition, the declining relative share of male low-skilled workers may
also help to explain the rise in absolute earnings for low-skilled workers over both
decades.  However, relative supply movements clearly make the rise in differentials
in the 1980s a more puzzling phenomenon.
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B. Relative demand for skills
The supply analysis implies an important role for relative demand changes
in the 1980s.  Most previous research on the U.S. economy has usefully divided
relative demand changes into two categories: "between industry" factors which affect
product demand, and thus labor demand, across industries (e.g., the rise in services
versus manufacturing, or the rise in foreign versus domestic sources for
manufacturing goods);  and "within industry" factors which affect the valuation of
skills independently of changes in product demand (e.g. skills-biased technological
innovations, or organizational developments favoring skilled-workers).  While the
debate in the U.S. generally agrees on the importance of demand shifts, no clear
conclusions have been reached about these two, not necessarily competing
explanations.
Given international trade in goods and production technology, the demand
shifts hypothesized in the U.S. are also likely to have been operating in Britain.  The
dramatic decline in the share of manufacturing employment in total employment
evident in Figure 4 certainly makes a case for a careful examination of the role of
"between" industry effects in the growth of inequality during the 1980s.  While the
relatively poor range of industrial variables makes the GHS data set less than ideal
for analyzing relative demand shifts,  I have nevertheless conducted some crude tests
of the principal demand shift hypotheses.  The GHS data do allow us to distinguish
workers in three separate manufacturing categories from workers in agriculture,
services, and two other generally non-traded sectors (transport and communications,
and construction).  I will use these simple categories to attempt to estimate the effect
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(1)
(2)
of the general decline in domestic manufacturing on skill differentials and overall
earnings inequality.
Following Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman (1991), I use two methods to
estimate the role of industrial shifts in the rise in skill differentials between 1978-80
and 1986-88.  The first is a shift-share decomposition of the change in educational
differentials between the two periods.  The second is a regression-based
decomposition of education and experience differentials.
The shift-share decomposition divides the change in education differentials
into three components: (1) the portion due to between industry changes in the
distribution of employment by qualification; (2) the portion due to within-industry
changes in the earnings for workers with different qualifications; and (3) the
interaction of these two effects.
The decomposition involves several stages of calculations.  First, the raw
earnings data are used to calculate educational differentials, d , for each qualificationqst
(q) within each industrial sector (s), in each year (t):
where w refers to real wages,  0 is the base group with no qualifications, and a bar
indicates a sample mean.  Second, the qualification differentials in each sector are
used to produce an economy-wide "raw differential", d , for each qualification as aqt
weighted-average of the qualification differential in each of the sectors:
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(3)
(4)
where x is the proportion of all workers with qualification q working in industry s
at time t.  Third, the "between" industry effect is removed from the differential by re-
estimating d  using the average employment share for the period 1974-88:qt
Fourth, in a similar way the "within" industry effect is removed from the differential
by re-estimating d  using the average industry-specific differential for eachqt
qualification over the full sample:
Finally, the changes in the three differentials are calculated for the three sub-periods.
The interaction of the "between" and "within" industry effects is defined as the signed
difference between the change in the raw differential and the sum of the changes of
the two "controlled" differentials. 
The results of this shift-share decomposition for the 1980s appear in panel (b)
of Table 6.  The first column shows the actual change in the education differentials.
Note that these estimates differ slightly from earlier ones since the differentials here
are calculated using the raw data without controlling for compositional effects.  The
shifts in employment from manufacturing to the other sectors make only a negligible
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contribution toward the rise in differentials during the 1980s (see column 2 of panel
(b)).  The within-industry component of the change in differentials (column (3) of
panel (b)) accounts for nearly all of the rise in the overall education differentials.
The second decomposition technique attempts to measure the effect of
manufacturing-to-service employment changes using a modified human capital
earnings equation.  To implement this decomposition I pooled the GHS samples for
1978-80 and 1986-1988 (and separately 1974-76 and 1978-80) and used the data to
estimate an equation of the form:
(5) ln w  = a + b S  + b Q  + b (D Q ) + b R  + b (D R ) + ei 1 i 2 i 3 i i 4 i 5 i i i
where S is a vector of six industrial sector dummy variables; Q is a vector of
educational qualification dummy variables and their complete interactions with
experience and experience-squared; R is a vector of 9 region dummies; D is a dummy
variable equal to one if the observation belongs to the later sub-period; e is an error
term; and a and b are parameters to be estimated.  In this specification, the
coefficients, b , represent the change between the first and the second periods in the3
differential associated with each of the educational qualifications.  We can measure
the effect of between-industry employment changes by comparing the estimates of
b  in a regression like (5) with estimates of b  in an identical regression which3 3
excludes the industry sector dummies.   If the decline in relative earnings for the13
low-skilled is due to their increasing concentration outside the manufacturing sector,
then the estimated change in differentials (b ) should be smaller in the regression3
which controls for industrial sector.  The difference between the b  coefficients in the3
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regressions with and without the industry controls, therefore, should give an estimate
of the importance of industry shifts.
Panel (b) of Table 7 reports results of the regression decomposition of the
industry shift for the 1980s.  Column 1 presents the estimated increase in the
differential in a regression like (5) which excludes industrial sector controls.  These
differentials are nearly identical to those in column 2, estimated using six industry
dummies.  The resulting estimated cross-industry effects in column 3 are tiny,
reinforcing the conclusions from the shift-share analysis.14
The evidence from both decompositions suggests that the decline in the
manufacturing employment share was probably not the main source of widening skill
differentials.  This is not entirely surprising given that the manufacturing
employment share was falling in the 1970s as skill differentials and earnings
inequality were also dropping.
The decomposition results point strongly toward "within" industry factors.
Data on the breakdown of skill-group employment by industrial sector in
Tables 8A and 8B indicate that the pattern of labor demand within industries
including manufacturing changed significantly over the sample.  The share of
manufacturing employees with a university degree (see panel (a) of Table 8A) almost
tripled from 3.0 to 8.6 percent between 1974-76 and 1986-88.  The share of university
graduates in services (see panel (b)) did not quite double over the same period.
These numbers suggest a sharp rise in demand for skilled workers within
manufacturing, one which in relative terms was actually greater than in services.
The employment share of university graduates, however, may not reflect a
rise in demand so much as the greater abundance of university graduates by the end
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of the sample.  Jobs that had been filled by workers with less than university
education in 1974-76 may have been filled by university graduates in 1986-88 simply
because more workers had university degrees.  In this respect, the occupational
employment shares in Table 8B argue more persuasively that production methods
changed within manufacturing in ways that favored high-skilled workers.  Non-
manual employment (defined by job classification, not a worker's personal
characteristics) increased from approximately 26 percent of total manufacturing
employment in 1974-76 to 36 percent in 1986-88 -- with all of the increase stemming
from a higher share of professional employees.
A comparison of the 90-10 differentials in manufacturing and services
provides a final piece of evidence supporting the importance of "within" industry
effects.  Over the entire period 1974-88, the 90-10 differential for services was on
average about 0.30 log points larger than in manufacturing.  All else constant, the
shift in employment from manufacturing to services would have contributed to a rise
in inequality.  However, the 90-10 differential for manufacturing grew faster than in
services over the 1980s -- a 0.200 log point rise versus 0.178 -- a phenomonen that the
"between" industry hypothesis cannot explain.
To summarize the importance of relative supply and demand factors, I have
regressed the log of the university differential against the log of the relative supply
of university graduates and a quadratic trend term (to proxy shifts in relative
demand and other factors affecting the differential).  Estimating the equation using
Ordinary Least Squares on the sample 1974-88 gives an estimate of -0.29 for the
elasticity of the university differential with respect to the relative supply of university
graduates.   This supply elasticity can help to predict what might have happened to15
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differentials during the 1980s in the absence of a continued expansion of supply.
Restricting relative supplies of university graduates to their average level over the
1974-88 period and using the estimated supply elasticity yields an estimate of the
differential under the assumption that relative supplies were constant through the
1980s.  Under these assumptions the differential would have increased by 0.207 log
points (versus 0.067) between 1978-80 and 1986-88.  An alternative interpretation is,
of course, that relative demand shifts during the 1980s must have been very large to
make their effects felt despite large increases in relative supplies.
C. Labor market institutions
Labor supply and demand shifts can explain many of the similarities in the
development of the U.S. and British wage structures.  However, supply and demand
are less illuminating when it comes to explaining differences.  Labor market
institutions may be in a better position to account for the divergences, especially in
the experiences of low-skilled workers and the timing of the rise in inequality.  I
therefore now examine the role of several British labor market institutions: the
extensive use of incomes policies in Britain during the 1970s; the industry and
occupation-specific minimum wages set by national Wage Councils; the
unemployment benefit system; and trade unions.
1. Incomes policies of the 1970s
Five incomes policies were in effect during the first five years of the GHS
sample.  Two of these limited pay increases to a uniform nominal amount (the same,
fixed pounds-per-week ceiling applicable to workers at all pay levels); a third policy
prescribed proportional increases that may have impeded any underlying tendency
toward wage dispersion.  In an analysis which pays particular attention to wage
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differentials, Ashenfelter and Layard (1983) conclude that the incomes policies of the
1970s achieved some of their implicit wage compression targets and probably
prevented dispersion from increasing as fast as it would have in the absence of such
policies.  The effects, however, are difficult to quantify and incomes policies in the
1970s probably tell use little about the period of widening inequality in the 1980s.
2. Wage Councils
Britain did not have a statutory national minimum wage in force at any time
during the period 1974-88.  However, approximately 10 percent of the national labor
force worked in  industries covered by Wages Councils which set minimum pay rates
by occupation for workers under their jurisdiction.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that
a serious erosion in the scope, enforcement, and "bite" of Wage Council minimums
took place after the election of the Conservative government in 1979.  By the time the
Wage Act of 1986 restricted councils to setting a single minimum for all occupations
within a covered industry and removed workers under the age of 21 from councils
jurisdiction, Wage Councils had lost a great deal of their previous influence on
wages.
In a broader study of the effects of minimum pay rates on employment,
Machin and Manning (1992) examined the impact of Wage Councils on hourly wage
dispersion.  Their estimates suggest that the decline in Wage Council minimums
relative to industry averages resulted in an 8 percent increase in the coefficient of
variation of wages for covered workers.   Since this estimate excludes the effects of16
reduction in coverage and enforcement, it is probably an underestimate of the effect
of the decline in councils on dispersion.
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The demise of Wages Councils during the 1980s may have played an
important role in rising inequality during the 1980s. Nevertheless, the dismantling of
Wages Councils, which disproportionately protect the wages of low-earners, makes
it more difficult to explain the rise in real earnings for low-skilled workers.
3. Unemployment benefits
Real earnings for the low-skilled may have increased in Britain over the
sample because the benefit system placed an ever-rising floor on earnings.  A rise in
the real value of benefit could account for the simultaneous increase in low-skilled
earnings and unemployment.
A careful analysis of the effect of the complex British benefit system on low-
skilled workers over the 15 year period of the sample is well beyond the scope of this
paper.  As a quick check on the possible effects of benefits on low-skilled earnings,
I have graphed the indexed value of real unemployment benefits and the real
earnings of workers in the 10th percentile over the sample years in Figure 5.
Unemployment Benefit is an unemployment insurance program covering most
unemployed workers in the first year of unemployment.  The benefit data graphed
in Figure 5 are the log of the real statutory level of unemployment benefits for a
single man with no children (see Department of Social Security, 1992, Table C1.01).
Figure 5 suggests that the absolute value of unemployment benefit grew slightly over
the sample period.  However, unemployment benefit failed to keep pace with rises
in earnings of workers in the 10th percentile of the full-time earnings distribution.
In absolute terms the unemployment benefit system was not much more
generous in 1988 than it was in 1974.  However, in relative terms it was actually less
generous.  While the analysis is far from complete, the idea that the benefit system
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pushed real earnings of low-skilled workers up in absolute terms over the 1970s and
1980s does not appear to be consistent with evidence on unemployment benefit.
4. Trade unions
Perhaps the most striking institutional difference between Britain and the U.S.
is the much higher degree of unionization in Britain.  In Britain, union membership
grew rapidly during the 1970s to an historic peak of just under 60 percent of the
work force in 1979.  Union density in the U.S., on the other hand, declined steadily
in the 1970s, falling below 20 percent by the end of the decade.  In the 1980s, both
countries experienced drops of about 10 percentage points in union density.
Figure 6 shows a strong inverse relationship between trade union density and
overall earnings dispersion in Britain.  While the figure cannot establish causation,
the striking association suggests that the decline in unionization played a crucial role
in the development of the British wage structure during the 1980s.  In this respect,
it may be telling that the continuous decline in union density in the U.S. coincided
with a continuous rise in earnings inequality there. 
Following Freeman (1991, Table 2), Table 9 estimates the contribution of the
decline in union membership to the change in skill differentials from 1978-80 to 1986-
88 using microdata from the GHS.  Column 1 presents cross-section estimates of the
union differential from the GHS data for 1983 (the only year where the GHS asks
workers about their union affiliation).  As in the U.S., union differentials are small for
skilled workers and much larger for less-skilled workers.  Since no estimates of
British union membership by education or occupation exist for the skill groups and
time period in Table 9, column 2 uses the change in union membership in the whole
economy (-10.3 percentage points) to estimate the decline in union membership in
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each skill group.  Multiplying the change in membership by the union differential for
each skill group gives an estimate of the effect of union decline on the earnings of
each skill group.  A comparison of these union earnings effects across complementary
skill groups yields an estimate of the total effect of union decline on the
corresponding skill differential.  On this basis, union membership losses account for
about 21 percent of the rise in the university differential and 13 percent of the rise in
the non-manual differential during the 1980s.17
As with Wage Councils, the decline in union membership does not make it
any easier to account for the rise in low-skilled earnings.  However, it may be that
the divergent earnings experiences of low-skilled workers in the U.S. and Britain have
less to do with changes in institutions within the two countries over time and more
to do with cross-country differences in the levels of influence of the institutions.  Skill
differentials and overall inequality may have increased in Britain due to the
weakening of some labor market institutions, but low-skilled workers may have been
able to protect absolute earnings more effectively in Britain than in the U.S. due to
the much greater level of influence exerted by the British institutions.  Freeman (1991)
finds some evidence for this institutional "levels" effect in cross-sections of OECD
countries.  Countries with high union density have lower variances of earnings.  They
also experienced smaller changes in earnings differentials between 1978 and 1987.18
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V. Some Conclusions
The 1970s and 1980s were tumultuous times for the British earnings structure.
The GHS data indicate that skill differentials and overall earnings inequality fell
slightly during the 1970s and then rose sharply in the 1980s.
A simple relative supply and demand framework can explain many of these
developments.  Large increases in supplies of skilled labor helped to narrow skill
differentials during the 1970s.  During the 1980s, a strong rise in the demand for
skilled labor led to widening skill differentials despite a continued expansion in the
relative supply of skilled labor.  The GHS data provide little support for the
hypothesis that the decline in British manufacturing employment lies behind
changing relative demand for labor or the increase in inequality.  The GHS data,
however, do support the view that a rise in demand for skills within industries --
including manufacturing -- has made an important contribution to the rise in
inequality.
Labor market institutions also appear to have played an important role in the
changing earnings structure.  Incomes policies may have checked an underlying
tendency toward wage compression during the mid-1970s and delayed the onset of
rising inequality until the late 1970s.  The declining importance of Wages Councils,
and especially trade unions, also probably allowed for greated inequality during the
1980s.
What does the evidence from the 1970s and 1980s say about the 1990s?
Despite a British institutional framework which attenuates the effects of supply and
demand changes to a much greater degree than in the U.S., the same market forces
which led to widening differentials during the 1980s could act to close them in the
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1990s.  The rising differentials are providing a strong financial incentive for
individuals to acquire formal education and skills training.  The number of new
graduates, for example, increased steadily from approximately 95,000 in 1980 to over
120,000 in 1988 (Highly Qualified People: Supply and Demand, 1990).  Particularly
if Wages Councils and unions avoid further declines in influence, continuing supply
responses could conceivably undo many of the developments of the 1980s.
-29-
1. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Danny Blanchflower, Rebecca Blank, David Card,
Richard Freeman, Sarah Gammage, Richard Jackman, Alan Manning, Richard
Layard, Steve Machin, Dave Metcalf, Andrew Oswald, Steve Pischke,
Andrew Scott, Stephen Trejo, Jonathan Wadsworth, and seminar participants
at the Centre for Economic Performance, NBER, University College London,
and the Welfare State Programme for helpful comments and discussions.
Hilary Beedham, Maria Evandrou and Jane Falkingham provided invaluable
assistance with the General Household Survey.  Material from the GHS,
made available through the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys and
the ESRC Data Archive, has been used by permission of the Controller of
HM Stationery Office.  This paper was prepared for the National Bureau of
Economic Research conference on "Changes and Differences in Wage
Structures," in Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 23-24, 1992.  It will appear in
the conference volume edited by Richard Freeman and Lawrence Katz,
published by the University of Chicago Press.  This project was funded by
the Department of Employment EMRU, although the views expressed in this
paper do not necessarily represent those of the Department.  The Centre for
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research
Council.
2. See, for example, Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman (1991), Blackburn and
Bloom (1987), Bluestone (1990), Bluestone and Harrison (1988), Bound and
Johnson (1989), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1989), Katz and Murphy, (1992),
Katz and Revenga (1989), and Murphy and Welch (1992).
3. Three other papers address some of the issues discussed here.  Moghadam
(1990) examines changes in the returns to education in a much broader
analysis of wage determination using data from the Family Expenditure
Survey for the years 1978 to 1985.  Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1992)
compare changes in the wage structure in four OECD countries using
published data from the New Earnings Survey (NES) and microdata from the
GHS for their discussion of the U.K.  Bell, Rimmer and Rimmer (1992)
examine the role of age in overall wage inequality among full-time male
employees using micro-data from the NES.
4. For a detailed description of the GHS, see the annual reports on the GHS
published by the Office of Population and Census Surveys.  For a detailed
description of variables used in this paper, see Schmitt (1992).
5. The school leaving age was 14 until 1946, and then 15 until 1972.  This may
present some problems with interpretation of the data since the lowest skilled
group does not have a uniform absolute number of years of schooling over
time.  However, I find no difference in the basic results on skills premia and
earnings dispersion when I conduct the work reported here on a fixed
membership sub-sample defined by year of birth.  This cohort approach
keeps the composition of absolute years of schooling constant for the group
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with no qualifications (see Schmitt, 1991).
6. The determination of years of full-time education is problematic.  The GHS
asks respondents their age when they last left full-time education, not the
total number of years of full-time education.  Each of the 15 surveys has
several hundred (of 4,000 to 6,000 valid male) respondents who report
leaving their last period of full-time after the age of 30.  The experience
definition here assumes that anyone leaving full-time education after 27 has
not studied continuously.  In these cases, years of schooling is calculated as
age minus age left secondary school plus 3.
7. The condensed qualifications are defined as follows: UNIVERSITY is
UNIVERSITY; MIDDLE is VOC-HIGH, TEACHING, NURSING, A-LEVEL,
VOC-MIDDLE and O-LEVEL 5+; LOW is VOC-LOW, OLEV&CLER, O-
LEVEL 1-4, CLERICAL, VOC-OTHER and OTHER; NO QUAL is NO QUAL.
8. Meghir and Whitehouse (1992), however, do find a slight decline in real
hourly earnings between 1975 and 1986 for the 10th percentile of the
distribution of non-union, full- and part-time, manual male employees aged
22 to 56 using data from the Family Expenditure Survey (see their Figure 6).
But even in this fairly disadvantaged segment of the British labor market, the
25th percentile managed to hold it own between 1975 and 1986.
Furthermore, as they note, the variables they use to divide their sample into
union and non-union sectors are only indirect measures of union status and
may not be completely consistent over time.
9. To calculate the change in the employment probability adjusted differential,
multiply the average university differential from Table 3 for 1978-80 by the
relative university employment probability (1 - u )/(1 - u ) for theUNIV NOQUAL
same period (1.044 x 0.576 = 0.601);  do the same for 1986-88
(1.120 x 0.643 = 0.720); and then subtract the first from the second (0.720 -
 0.601 = 0.113).
10. A-levels are normally a prerequisite for university admission; students taking
A-levels generally have 5 or more O-levels.  Therefore the large expansion in
university education in the 1970s and 1980s probably explains the low
employment rates among individuals with these qualifications.
11. See, for example, Freeman (1978), Bound and Johnson (1989), Blackburn,
Bloom and Freeman (1991), Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy and Welch
(1992).
12. Unless females with educational qualifications substituted for males with no
qualifications.  However, given the employment structure and occupational
gender segmentation in Britain during the sample period this is probably not
an important factor.
13. The qualification differentials are constructed exactly as in Table 3.
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14. While the two decompositions are related, it is important to be clear about
how they differ.  The shift-share decomposition does not control for
compositional effects due to experience or region, but it does allow for
education differentials to vary across sectors.  The regression decomposition
controls for compositional effects, but imposes the restriction that educational
differentials are identical across industries.
15. The standard error of the supply elasticity is (0.093) making it significant at
the 1 percent level; the R  is 0.456; and the Durbin Watson statistic is 1.642
(critical value d =0.95 and d =0.1.54) providing no indication of serialL U
correlation.
16. For the decline in the industry minimum relative to the industry average see
their Figure 4.  For wage dispersion see their Figure 5.  The dispersion-to-
elasticity figure is based on their Table 2, columns 3 and 4.
17. These estimates lie very close to the 25 percent figure for the U.S. by Freeman
(1991).  Table 9 makes two assumptions which bias the estimates in different
directions.  The assumption that declines in membership were uniform across
skill groups probably significantly reduces the union effect.  Declines in
membership were almost certainly much greater among low-skilled workers.
In the U.S., for example, unionization rates among college graduates fell 3
percentage points between 1978 and 1988 and while those for high school
graduates dropped 12 percentage points (Freeman, 1991, Table 2).  On the
other hand, the assumption of a constant union markup probably inflates the
union effect given some evidence that the union differential fell slightly in
Britain during the 1980s.  Using plausible values for both missing numbers
suggests that Table 9 probably underestimates the union effect on
differentials.
18. Freeman (1991), Tables 8 and 9, pp. 36-37.
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Table 1
Education qualification variables
Variable      Description
UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY: Higher degree (Census Level A), first degree,
university diploma or certificate, qualifications obtained
from colleges of further education or from professional
institutions of degree standard (Census Level B)
VOC-HIGH HIGHEST VOCATIONAL: Higher National Certificate
(HNC) or Diploma (HND), BEC/TEC Higher Certificate or
Higher Diploma, City and Guilds Full Technological
Certificate, qualifications obtained from colleges of further
education or professional institutions below degree level but
above GCE A level standard
TEACHING TEACHING: Non-graduate teaching qualifications (Census
Level C)
NURSING NURSING: Nursing qualifications (e.g. SEN, SRN, SCM)
A-LEVEL A LEVEL: GCE A level, Scottish Leaving Certificate (SLC),
Scottish Certificate of Education (SCE), Scottish University
Preliminary Examination (SUPE) at Higher Grade, Certificate
of Sixth Year Studies
VOC-MIDDLE MIDDLE VOCATIONAL: City and Guilds Advanced or
Final, Ordinary National Certificate (ONC) or Diploma
(OND), BEC/TEC National, General or Ordinary
O-LEVEL 5+ FIVE OR MORE O LEVELS: Five or more subjects at GCE O
level obtained before 1975 or in grades A to C if obtained
later, 5 or more subjects at SCE Ordinary obtained before
1973 or in bands A to C if obtained later, 5 or more subjects
at CSE grade 1 or at School Certificate, SLC Lower, or SUPE
Lower
VOC-LOW LOWER-MIDDLE VOCATIONAL: City and Guilds Craft or
Ordinary
O-LEV & CLER LESS THAN FIVE O LEVELS WITH CLERICAL OR
COMMERCIAL QUALIFICATION: One to four subjects at
GCE O level or equivalent with clerical or commercial
qualification such as typing, shorthand, book-keeping,
commerce
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O-LEVEL 1-4 LESS THAN 5 O LEVELS WITHOUT CLERICAL OR
COMMERCIAL QUALIFICATION
CLERICAL CLERICAL OR COMMERCIAL QUALIFICATION
WITHOUT O LEVELS
VOC-OTHER LOWEST VOCATIONAL:  Miscellaneous apprenticeships
OTHER M I S C E L L A N E O U S ,  N O N - V O C A T I O N A L
QUALIFICATIONS: Other qualifications including CSE
Grades 2-5, all remaining qualifications which consist mainly
of local or regional school leaving certificates and college or
professional awards not regarded as 'higher education' (not
above GCE A level standard)
NO QUAL NO QUALIFICATIONS: Including those with no formal schooling
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Table 2
Log real weekly earnings deciles and quartiles
                                                                                                         
(1)          (2)          (3)       Change    Change
                      74-76      78-80       86-88      (2)-(1)      (3)-(2)
                                                                                                             
(a) Raw earnings
 90-10        0.957       0.947       1.170      -0.010       0.223
       90-50        0.471       0.469       0.586      -0.003       0.117
      50-10        0.486       0.479       0.583      -0.007       0.104
       75-25        0.468       0.476       0.615       0.008       0.139
       Standard                                             
      Deviation        0.422       0.412       0.524      -0.011       0.112
(b) Residual earnings
       90-10        0.753       0.750       0.888      -0.003       0.138
            90-50        0.379       0.388       0.446       0.009       0.057
            50-10        0.374       0.362       0.442      -0.012       0.080
            75-25        0.388       0.378       0.445      -0.009       0.067
       Standard                                           
      Deviation        0.318       0.313       0.378      -0.006       0.066
                                                                                           
Source: General Household Survey.
-35-
Table 3A
Skill differentials: 16-64 year olds
                                                                                                                
    (1)            (2)            (3)       Change       Change
                     74-76         78-80        86-88       (2)-(1)         (3)-(2)
                                                                                                       
(a) Educational Qualifications (20 years experience)
UNIVERSITY         0.700         0.576         0.643       -0.124          0.067
VOC-HIGH           0.400         0.306          0.382       -0.094          0.076
A-LEVEL              0.529         0.395          0.494       -0.134          0.098
VOC-MIDDLE       0.266         0.193          0.282       -0.073          0.089
O-LEVEL 5+          0.471         0.312          0.351       -0.160          0.039
VOC-LOW            0.199         0.153          0.202        -0.046         0.048
O-LEVEL 1-4         0.312         0.285          0.331        -0.027         0.046
VOC-OTHER         0.085         0.079          0.096        -0.006         0.017
NO-QUAL            0.000         0.000          0.000      0.000         0.000
(b) Years of potential experience
 0 YEARS              0.000         0.000          0.000         0.000         0.000
 5 YEARS             0.219         0.192          0.258        -0.027         0.066
10 YEARS              0.396         0.346          0.468        -0.049         0.121
20 YEARS              0.620         0.542          0.739        -0.078         0.196
30 YEARS              0.674         0.588          0.813        -0.087         0.225
40 YEARS              0.558         0.483          0.690        -0.075         0.207
                                                                                                    
Source: General Household Survey.
Notes:
(1) Average values implied by annual regressions of log real weekly pay
against 13 education dummies, experience and its square fully interacted
with education dummies, and 9 regional dummies.
(2) Education differential is the value of the qualification-specific dummy
variable, plus the qualification-specific experience differential evaluated at
20 years, minus the experience differential at 20 years for workers with no
qualifications.
(3) Experience differential is the fixed weighted average over all education
groups.  Weights are the average employment share for each qualification
over the period 1974-88.
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Table 3B
Skill differentials: 16-30 year olds
                                                                                                            
       (1)            (2)          (3)       Change    Change
                   74-76        78-80       86-88       (2)-(1)      (3)-(2)
                                                                                              
(a) Educational Qualifications (5 years experience)
UNIVERSITY       0.622       0.526       0.744      -0.096       0.218
VOC-HIGH         0.447         0.375       0.578      -0.072       0.203
A-LEVEL            0.237         0.333       0.405       0.096       0.072
VOC-MIDDLE     0.264         0.384       0.333       0.120      -0.052
O-LEVEL 5+        0.166         0.100       0.246      -0.066       0.145
VOC-LOW          0.127         0.307        0.158       0.180     -0.148
O-LEVEL 1-4      -0.002         0.051        0.116       0.054      0.065
VOC-OTHER       0.353         0.336        0.365      -0.017      0.030
NO-QUAL          0.000         0.000        0.000       0.000       0.000
(b) Years of potential experience
 0 YEARS           0.000         0.000         0.000       0.000       0.000
 5 YEARS           0.291         0.228         0.322      -0.063       0.094
10 YEARS          0.581         0.456          0.643       0.125      0.187
                                                                                              
Source: General Household Survey.
Notes:
(1) Average values implied by annual regressions of log real weekly pay against
13 education dummies, years of experience fully interacted with education
dummies, and 9 regional dummies.
(2) Education differential is the value of the qualification-specific dummy
variable, plus the qualification-specific experience differential evaluated at 5
years, minus the experience differential at 5 years for workers with no
qualifications.
(3) Experience differential is the fixed weighted average over all education
groups.  Weights are the average employment share for each qualification
over the period 1974-88.
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Table 4
Unemployment and relative employment rates
                                                                                                            
(1)         (2)         (3)       Change      Change
                     74-76      78-80     86-88       (2)-(1)        (3)-(2)
                                                                                             
(a) Estimated unemployment rate
UNIVERSITY         0.014      0.013     0.027       -0.001         0.014
VOC-HIGH           0.010      0.009     0.028        -0.001        0.019
A-LEVEL              0.020      0.014     0.050        -0.007        0.037
VOC-MIDDLE       0.006      0.017     0.042         0.011        0.025
O-LEVEL 5+          0.011      0.016     0.040         0.005        0.024
VOC-LOW            0.014      0.021     0.054         0.007        0.033
O-LEVEL 1-4         0.017      0.019     0.049         0.002        0.030
VOC-OTHER         0.026      0.036     0.085         0.010        0.049
NO QUAL            0.041      0.055      0.131         0.014        0.077
(b) Employment to population ratio
UNIVERSITY        0.928       0.941      0.912        0.012       -0.029
 
VOC-HIGH          0.961       0.957      0.924        -0.004      -0.033
A-LEVEL             0.786       0.752      0.779        -0.034      -0.027
VOC-MIDDLE      0.971       0.957      0.895        -0.014      -0.063
O-LEVEL 5+         0.834       0.835      0.764         0.001      -0.071
VOC-LOW           0.960       0.939      0.889        -0.021      -0.051
O-LEVEL 1-4        0.909       0.878      0.855        -0.031      -0.023
VOC-OTHER        0.942       0.908      0.796        -0.034      -0.112
NO QUAL           0.886       0.845       0.704       -0.040      -0.142
                                                                                             
Source: General Household Survey.
Notes:
(1) Unemployment rates implied by probit regression of employment status against 9 education
dummies, age and its square, and 9 region dummies.  The 9 qualifications are the 8 here
plus an "other" category not shown.  Predicted rates evaluated at age 40.
(2) Employment-population ratio calculated as GHS sample share of all 16 to 64 year old males
in full- or part-time employment. 
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Table 5
Relative supply of skills
                                                                                                            
(1)           (2)      (3)       Change     Change
                      74-76        78-80      86-88      (2)-(1)       (3)-(2)                  
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                
(a) Relative supply of males, 16-64
UNIVERSITY         0.048        0.079      0.109       0.030        0.031
VOC-HIGH           0.044         0.065     0.097       0.022        0.032
A-LEVEL              0.030         0.021     0.045      -0.015        0.024
VOC-MIDDLE       0.042         0.043     0.076       0.001        0.033
O-LEVEL 5+          0.058        0.066     0.043       0.008        -0.023
VOC-LOW            0.048         0.046     0.063       0.002        0.017
O-LEVEL 1-4         0.051         0.058     0.085       0.008        0.027
VOC-OTHER         0.095        0.100      0.071       0.006       -0.029
NO QUAL            0.517         0.464     0.323      -0.053        -0.141
(b) Ratio of females to males, 16-64
UNIVERSITY        0.272         0.314      0.455       0.041        0.142
  
VOC-HIGH          0.107         0.139      0.172       0.032        0.033
A-LEVEL             0.584         0.574      0.819      -0.010        0.245
VOC-MIDDLE      0.062         0.083      0.252       0.021        0.169
O-LEVEL 5+         0.971         1.045      1.446       0.074        0.401
VOC-LOW           0.114         0.135      0.311       0.021        0.176
O-LEVEL 1-4        0.701         0.827      0.828       0.126        0.001
VOC-OTHER        0.095         0.119      0.143       0.024        0.024
NO QUAL           0.812         0.852      0.857       0.040        0.005
                                                                                           
Source: General Household Survey.
Note:
Columns in panel (a) do not total to one due to the exclusion of workers with qualifications
not shown.
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Table 6
Industry-based shift-share decomposition
                                                                                                                
                               Change in Differential Due To:
                   Between     Within
              Change in Raw    Industry     Industry     Inter-
              Differential      Shifts         Shifts         action
                                                                                                 
(a) 1974-76 to 1978-80
UNIVERSITY                -0.074              0.006         -0.078         -0.002
VOC-HIGH                -0.109             -0.003          -0.105         -0.001
A-LEVEL                      0.161              0.004           0.166         -0.008
VOC-MIDDLE               0.040              0.000           0.040         -0.001
O-LEVEL 5+                 -0.194             -0.022          -0.174          0.001
VOC-LOW                    0.128              0.001           0.128         -0.001
O-LEVEL 1-4                 0.004              0.006           0.003         -0.005
VOC-OTHER                -0.003             -0.001         -0.003           0.001
(b) 1978-80 to 1986-88
                   
UNIVERSITY                0.080              0.001           0.074          0.004
VOC-HIGH                  0.048              0.004           0.042          0.002
A-LEVEL                    -0.068              0.005          -0.075          0.003
VOC-MIDDLE             -0.053              0.004          -0.061          0.004
O-LEVEL 5+                 0.161             0.036            0.128         -0.003
VOC-LOW                  -0.139             -0.003          -0.132         -0.004
O-LEVEL 1-4                0.016              0.007           0.005          0.004
VOC-OTHER                0.008             -0.002           0.009          0.001
                                                                                                
Source: General Household Survey.
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Table 7
Industry-based regression decomposition
                                                                                                    
   Change in Regression Est'd Differential
                                            Estimated
              No Industry   6 Industry     Industry
                 Controls        Controls       Effect
                                                                                                   
(a) 1974-76 to 1978-80
UNIVERSITY         -0.121       -0.113       -0.008
VOC-HIGH           -0.090       -0.098       -0.008
A-LEVEL            -0.142       -0.138       -0.004
VOC-MIDDLE        -0.071       -0.064       -0.007
O-LEVEL 5+        -0.168       -0.174        0.006
VOC-LOW           -0.052       -0.052        0.001
O-LEVEL 1-4        -0.025       -0.020       -0.005
VOC-OTHER          -0.009       -0.012        0.003
(b) 1978-80 to 1986-88
UNIVERSITY          0.066        0.063       -0.003
VOC-HIGH            0.077        0.075        0.002
A-LEVEL            0.106        0.099        0.007
VOC-MIDDLE          0.084        0.083       -0.001
O-LEVEL 5+          0.046        0.050       -0.004
VOC-LOW             0.052        0.053       -0.002
O-LEVEL 1-4         0.050        0.041        0.010
VOC-OTHER           0.013        0.018       -0.005
                                                                                                   
Source: General Household Survey.
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Table 8A
Skills distribution by industry: education
                                                                                                                
   (1)       (2)       (3)    Change  Change
              74-76    78-80    86-88  (2)-(1)    (3)-(2)
                                                                                                    
(a) Manufacturing
UNIVERSITY     0.030    0.051    0.086    0.021    0.035
VOC-HIGH       0.043    0.068    0.128    0.026    0.059
A-LEVEL        0.016    0.009    0.028   -0.007    0.019
VOC-MIDDLE             0.056    0.046    0.090   -0.010    0.044
O-LEVEL 5+     0.039    0.056    0.029    0.016   -0.027
VOC-LOW        0.052    0.046    0.070   -0.006    0.023
O-LEVEL 1-4    0.044    0.049    0.079    0.005    0.030
VOC-OTHER     0.120    0.130    0.093    0.010   -0.037
NO QUAL        0.546    0.483    0.324   -0.063   -0.160
(b) Services
UNIVERSITY     0.096    0.154    0.179    0.058    0.025
VOC-HIGH       0.058    0.078    0.097    0.021    0.019
A-LEVEL        0.056    0.028    0.071   -0.028    0.044
VOC-MIDDLE     0.030    0.029    0.067   -0.001    0.038
O-LEVEL 5+     0.100    0.090    0.065   -0.010   -0.025
VOC-LOW        0.034    0.030    0.047   -0.004    0.018
O-LEVEL 1-4    0.068    0.079    0.095    0.011    0.017
VOC-OTHER      0.057    0.061    0.043    0.004   -0.018
NO QUAL        0.404    0.358    0.238   -0.046   -0.120
                                                                                                    
Source: General Household Survey.
Note:
Skills shares within each industry grouping do not total to one due to
exclusion of workers with qualifications not listed.
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Table 8B
Skills distribution by industry: occupation
                                                                                                                 
  (1)        (2)       (3)    Change Change
              74-76    78-80    86-88   (2)-(1)   (3)-(2)
                                                                                                   
(a) Manufacturing
Non-manual
      Prof    0.136    0.150    0.243    0.013    0.093
     Other    0.119    0.114    0.112   -0.004   -0.003
Manual
   Skilled   0.519    0.518    0.459   -0.002   -0.058
 Semi-sk'd    0.191    0.185    0.159   -0.007   -0.026
    Unsk'd    0.033    0.033    0.027   -0.000   -0.006
(b) Services
Non-manual
Prof    0.337    0.328    0.378   -0.009    0.050
     Other    0.325    0.329    0.287    0.004   -0.042
Manual
   Skilled    0.203    0.208    0.206    0.006   -0.002
 Semi-sk'd    0.083    0.077    0.071   -0.006   -0.006
    Unsk'd    0.035    0.038    0.034    0.004   -0.004
                                                                                                   
Source: General Household Survey.
Note:
Skills shares within each industry grouping do not total to one due to exclusion of
workers in "personal services" occupation.
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Table 9
Unions and skill differentials, 1978-80 to 1986-88
                                                                                                           
Union     Change                Change   Share of
          Diff'l      Union    Effect on    Skill       Change
          (1983)   Mem'ship     Earnings   Diff'l   Explained
                                                                                                
(a) Education differentials
UNIV        0.031     -0.103     -0.003
NOQUAL      0.170     -0.103     -0.018
                                 ______
  Total     0.014       0.067         0.21
(b) Occupation differentials
Non-manual   0.078     -0.103     -0.008
Manual      0.227      -0.103      -0.023
                                 ______
   Total                              0.014        0.110         0.13
                                                                                                
Notes:
(1) Union differentials for 1983 estimated using GHS data with the model from
Table 3, augmented by a trade union membership dummy variable and its
interaction with relevant skill categories.
(2) The change in union membership is the change in overall union membership.
For membership data 1974-78, see CSO, Social Trends 18, 1988, Table 11.8,
p.172; and 1979-88, see Bird, Stevens and Yates (1991), p. 337.  The working
population is employees in employment in June of each year from the
Department of Employment, Gazette.
(3) Change in university differential from Table 3.  Change in non-manual
differential from OLS regressions of natural log of real pay against a dummy
variable for non-manual job, experience and experience-squared and their
interactions with the non-manual dummy, and 9 region dummies.
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Figure 1
'Indexed' real weekly earnings
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Figure 2
Education differential, 20 years experience
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Figure 3
Unemployment rate
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Figure 4
Share in total employment
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Figure 5
'Indexed' benefit and earnings
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Figure 6
Union density and earnings dispersion
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